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THE ELGAMAL CRYPTOSYSTEM OVER CIRCULANT
MATRICES
AYAN MAHALANOBIS
ABSTRACT. In this paper we study extensively the discrete logarithm
problem in the group of non-singular circulant matrices. The emphasis
of this study was to find the exact parameters for the group of circulant
matrices for a secure implementation. We tabulate these parameters. We
also compare the discrete logarithm problem in the group of circulant
matrices with the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields and with the
discrete logarithm problem in the group of rational points of an elliptic
curve.
1. INTRODUCTION
Two of the most popular groups used in the discrete logarithm problem
are the group of units of a finite field and the group of rational points of
an elliptic curve over a finite field. The obvious question arises, are there
any other groups? I write this paper to show, that there are matrix groups –
the group of non-singular circulant matrices, which is much better than the
finite fields in every aspect and even better than the elliptic curves when one
considers the size of the field for a secure implementation. The size of the
field for a secure implementation is a huge issue in public key cryptography.
One of the reasons, elliptic curves are preferred over a finite field discrete
logarithm problem, is the size of the field for a secure implementation. In
our current state of knowledge, it is believed that the discrete logarithm
problem over F21028 offers the same security that of most elliptic curves
over F2160 . As our processors get faster and with the advent of distributed
computing these sizes will grow bigger with time. In the case of an elliptic
curve the rate of growth is much smaller than that of finite fields. We will
see, for circulant matrices the size of the field for a secure implementation
can get even smaller. The comparison of speed, between circulants and
elliptic curves, in an actual implementation is yet to be done. But, since the
circulants use smaller field, it is likely that the circulants are faster.
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It is known [6, 10] that the group of circulant matrices offers the same
security of a finite field of about same size, with half the computational
cost. The other interesting fact about circulant matrices is the size of the
field for a secure implementation. The arithmetic of the circulant matrices
is implemented over a finite field, very similar to the case of elliptic curves,
where the arithmetic is also implemented over a finite field. In the case of
circulants, the size of the field can be smaller than the one used for elliptic
curves. This is extensively studied in Section 5, and the results are tabulated
in Table 2. To sum it up, the advantage of circulants is that it uses smaller
field and is faster.
In this paper, we denote the group of non-singular circulant matrices of
size d by C(d, q) and the group of special circulant matrices, i.e., circulant
matrices with determinant 1, by SC(d, q) respectively.
Definition 1 (Circulant matrix C(d, q)). A d × d matrix over a field F is
called a circulant matrix, if every row except the first row, is a right circular
shift of the row above that. So a circulant matrix is defined by its first row.
One can define a circulant matrix similarly using columns.
A matrix is a two dimensional object, but a circulant matrix behaves like
a one dimensional object – given by the first row or the first column. We
will denote a circulant matrix C of size d, with the first row c0, c1, . . . , cd−1,
by C = circ (c0, c1, c2, . . . , cd−1). An example of a circulant 5 × 5 matrix
is: 

c0 c1 c2 c3 c4
c4 c0 c1 c2 c3
c3 c4 c0 c1 c2
c2 c3 c4 c0 c1
c1 c2 c3 c4 c0


One can define a representer polynomial corresponding to the circulant ma-
trix C as φC = c0 + c1x + c2x2 + . . . + cd−1xd−1. The circulants form
a commutative ring under matrix multiplication and matrix addition and is
isomorphic to (the isomorphism being circulant matrix to the representer
polynomial)R = F [x]
xd − 1
. For more on circulant matrices, see [2].
We will study the discrete logarithm problem in SC(d, q), the special
circulant matrix. It is fairly straightforward to see that one can develop a
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol or the ElGamal cryptosystem from
this discrete logarithm problem. The ElGamal cryptosystem over SL(d, q),
the special linear group of size d over Fq is described below. Since the spe-
cial circulant matrix is contained in the special linear group, this description
of the ElGamal cryptosystem works for SC(d, q) as well.
All fields considered in this paper are finite and of characteristic 2.
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2. THE ELGAMAL OVER SL(d, q)
Private Key: m, m ∈ N.
Public Key: A and Am. Where A ∈ SL(d, q).
Encryption.
a: To send a message (plaintext) v ∈ Fdq , Bob computes Ar and Amr
for an arbitrary r ∈ N.
b: The ciphertext is
(
Ar, AmrvT
)
. Where vT is the transpose of v.
Decryption.
a: Alice knows m, when she receives the ciphertext
(
Ar, AmrvT
)
,
she computes Amr from Ar, then A−mr and then computes v from
AmrvT.
We show that the security of the ElGamal cryptosystem over SL(d, q),
is equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman problem in SL(d, q). Since SC(d, q) is
contained in SL(d, q), this proves that the security of ElGamal cryptosystem
is equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman problem in SC(d, q).
Assume that Eve can solve the Diffie-Hellman problem, then from the
public information, she knowsAm. From a ciphertext
(
Ar, ArmvT
)
she gets
Ar. Since she can solve the Diffie-Hellman problem, she computes Arm
and can decrypt the ciphertext. The converse follows from the following
theorem, which is an adaptation of [4, Proposition 2.10]
Theorem 1. Suppose Eve has access to an oracle that can decrypt arbitrary
ciphertext of the above cryptosystem for any private key, then she can solve
the Diffie-Hellman problem in SL(d, q).
Proof. Let g = Aa and h = Ab. Eve takes an arbitrary element v in the
vector space of dimension d on which SL(d, q) acts. We use the same basis
used for the representation of SL(d, q). Then v = (v1,v2, . . . ,vd) where
vi ∈ F
×
q . Let v̂i = (0, . . . ,vi, . . . , 0) and c = v̂Ti . She pretends that A
and Aa is a public key. Sends that information to the oracle. Then asks the
oracle to decrypt (h, c). Oracle sends back to Eve, h−ac. Eve knowing v,
computes the ith column of A−ab from h−ac. In d tries Aab is found. This
solves the Diffie-Hellman problem. 
3. SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED ELGAMAL CRYPTOSYSTEM
This paper is primarily focused on the discrete logarithm problem in the
automorphism group of a vector space over a finite field. There are two
kinds of attack on the discrete logarithm problem.
(i) The “so called” generic attacks, like the Pollard’s rho algorithm.
These attacks use a black box group algorithm. The time complexity
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of these algorithms is about the same as the square-root of the size
of the group.
(ii) The other one is an index calculus attack. These attacks do not work
in any group.
Black box group algorithms work in any group, hence they will work in
SC(d, q) as well. The most efficient way to use black box attack on the dis-
crete logarithm problem, is to use the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [4, Section
2.9] first. This reduces the discrete logarithm problem to the prime divisors
of the order of the element (the base for the discrete logarithm) and then use
the Chinese remainder theorem to construct a solution for the original dis-
crete logarithm problem. One can use the Pollard’s rho algorithm to solve
the discrete logarithm problem in the prime divisors. So the whole process
can be summarized as follows: the security of the discrete logarithm against
generic attacks, is the security of the discrete logarithm in the largest prime
divisor of the order. We cannot prevent these attacks. These generic attacks
are of exponential time complexity and are not of much concern.
The biggest threat to any cryptosystem using the discrete logarithm prob-
lem is a subexponential attack like the index calculus attack [8]. It is often
argued [5,9] that there is no index calculus algorithm for most elliptic curve
cryptosystems that has subexponential time complexity. This fact is often
used to promote elliptic curve cryptosystem over a finite field cryptosys-
tem [5]. So, the best we can hope from the discrete logarithm problem in
SC(d, q) is, there is no index calculus attack or the index calculus attack
becomes exponential.
The expected asymptotic complexity of the index calculus algorithm in
Fqk is exp
(
(c+ o(1))(log qk)
1
3 (log log qk)
2
3
)
, where c is a constant, see [8]
and [5, Section 4]. If the degree of the extension, k, is greater than log2 q
then the asymptotic time complexity of the index calculus algorithm be-
comes exponential. In our case this means, if d > log2 q, the asymptotic
complexity of the index calculus algorithm on circulant matrices of size d
becomes exponential.
If we choose d ≥ log2 q, then the discrete logarithm problem in SC(d, q)
becomes as secure as the ElGamal over an elliptic curve, because the index
calculus algorithm is exponential; otherwise we can not guarantee. But on
the other hand, in the proposed cryptosystem, encryption and decryption
works in Fq and breaking the cryptosystem depends on solving a discrete
logarithm problem in Fqd−1 . Since, implementing the index calculus attack
becomes harder as the field gets bigger. It is clear that if we take d≪ log2 q,
then the cryptosystem is much more secure than the ElGamal cryptosystem
over Fq.
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4. IS THE ELGAMAL CRYPTOSYSTEM OVER SC(d, q) REALLY USEFUL?
For a circulant matrix over a field of even characteristic, squaring is
fast. It is shown [6, Theorem 2.2] that, if A = circ (a0, a1, . . . , ad−1),
then A2 = circ
(
a2pi(0), a
2
pi(1), . . . , a
2
pi(d−1)
)
. Where pi is a permutation of
{0, 1, 2, . . . , d− 1}. Now the ais belong to the underlying field Fq of char-
acteristic 2. In this field, squaring is just a cyclic shift using a normal ba-
sis [7, Chapter 4] representation of the field elements.
It was shown by Mahalanobis [6], that if five conditions are satisfied, then
the security of the discrete logarithm problem for circulant matrices of size
d over Fq is the same as the discrete logarithm problem in Fqd−1 .
The five conditions are:
a. The circulant matrix should have determinant 1.
b. The matrix A should have row-sum 1.
c. The integer d is prime.
d. The polynomial χA
x− 1
is irreducible.
e. q is primitive mod d.
In short, the argument for these five conditions are the following:
Let A = circ (a0, a1, . . . , ad−1) and let χA be the characteristic polyno-
mial of A. It is easy to see that the row-sum, a0 + a1 + · · ·+ ad−1, sum of
all elements in a row, is constant for a circulant matrix. This row-sum, α is
an eigenvalue of A and belongs to Fq. Clearly, αm is an eigenvalue of Am.
This α and αm can reduce a part of the discrete logarithm problem in A, to
a discrete logarithm problem in the field Fq. If the row-sum is 1, then there
is no such issue. This is the reason behind the condition, the row-sum is 1.
Now assume that χA
x− 1
= f e11 f
e2
2 . . . f
en
n , where each fi is an irreducible
polynomial and eis are positive integers1. Then it follows, the discrete loga-
rithm problem inA, can be reduced to discrete logarithm problems in Fq[x]
fi
,
for each i. Then one can solve the individual discrete logarithms in exten-
sions of Fq, put those solutions together using the Chinese remainder the-
orem and solve the discrete logarithm problem in A. The degree of these
extensions, the size of which provides us with the better security, is maxi-
mized when χA
x− 1
is irreducible. This is the reason for χA
x− 1
is irreducible.
The ring of circulant matrices is isomorphic to Fq[x]
xd − 1
, moreover
Fq[x]
xd − 1
is isomorphic to Fq[x]
x− 1
×
Fq[x]
Φ(x)
, where Φ(x) = x
d − 1
x− 1
is the dth cyclotomic
1Condition c. ensures that ei = 1 for all i.
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polynomial. If d is prime and q is primitive modulo d, then the cyclotomic
polynomial Φ(x) is irreducible. In this case, the discrete logarithm problem
in circulant matrices reduce to the discrete logarithm problem in Fqd−1 .
4.1. What are the advantages of using circulant matrices? The advan-
tages of using circulant matrices are:
• Multiplying circulant matrices of size d over Fq is twice as fast com-
pared to multiplication in the field of size Fqd .
• Computing the inverse of a circulant matrix is easy.
Since any circulant matrixA can be represented as a polynomial of the form
f(x) = c0+c1x+. . .+cd−1x
d−1
. This polynomial is invertible, implies that,
gcd
(
f(x), xd − 1
)
= 1. Then one can use the extended Euclid’s algorithm
to find the inverse. In our cryptosystem, we need to find that inverse, and it
is easily computable.
We now compare the following three cryptosystems for security and speed.
We do not compare the key sizes and the size of the ciphertext, as these can
be decided easily.
1. The ElGamal cryptosystem using the circulant matrices of size d
over Fq.
2. The ElGamal cryptosystem using the group of an elliptic curve.
3. The ElGamal cryptosystem over Fqd .
4.2. ElGamal over Fqd vs. the circulants of size d over Fq. Clearly the
circulants are the winner in this case. The circulants provide almost the
same security as the ElGamal over the finite field Fqd , but multiplication in
the circulants is twice as fast compared to the multiplication in the finite
field Fqd . See Silverman [10, 11] for more details.
To understand the difference, we need to understand the standard field
multiplication. A field Fqd over Fq, an extension of degree d, is a com-
mutative algebra of dimension d over Fq. Let α0, α1, . . . , αd−1 be a ba-
sis of Fqd over Fq. Let A := (a0α0 + a1α1 + · · ·+ ad−1αd−1), B :=
(b0α0 + b1α1 + · · ·+ bd−1αd−1) and
C := A · B = (c0α0 + c1α1 + · · ·+ cd−1αd−1)
be elements of Fqd .
The objective of multiplication is to find ck for k = 0, 1, . . . , (d − 1).
Now notice that, if
αiαj =
d−1∑
k=0
tkijαk,
we can define a d × d matrix Tk as {tkij}ij . It follows that ck = ATkBt.
The number of nonzero entries in the matrix Tk, which is constant over
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k, is called the complexity of the field multiplication [7, Chapter 5]. The
following theorem is well known [7, Theorem 5.1]:
Theorem 2. For any normal basis N of Fqd over Fq, the complexity of
multiplication is at least 2d− 1.
Note that in an implementation of a field exponentiation, one must use a
normal basis to use the square and multiply algorithm.
In our case, circulants of size d over a finite field Fq, the situation is
much different. We need a normal basis implementation for Fq. However,
to implement multiplication of two circulants, i.e., multiplication in R =
Fq[x]
xd − 1
we can use the basis
{
1, x, x2, . . . , xd−1
}
.
In a very similar way as before, if A := a0 + a1x + . . . + ad−1xd−1 and
B := b0+ b1x+ . . . bd−1x
d−1 then C := A ·B = c0+ c1x+ . . .+ cd−1xd−1.
Our job is to compute ck for k = 0, 1, . . . , d− 1. It follows that
(1) ck =
d−1∑
i=0
aibj where i+ j = k mod d and 0 ≤ i, j ≤ d− 1
It is now clear that the complexity of the multiplication is d. Compare this
to the best case situation for the optimal normal basis [7, Chapter 5], in
which case it is 2d − 1. So multiplying circulants take about half the time
that of finite fields.
It is clear that the keysizes will be the same for both these cryptosystems.
4.3. The elliptic curve ElGamal vs. the circulants of size d. In this case
there is no clear winner. On one hand, take the case of embedding degree.
For most elliptic curves the embedding degree is very large. The embedding
degree, that we refer to as the security advantage, for a circulant is tied up
with the size of the matrix. For a matrix of size d, it is d − 1. So with
circulants, it is hard to get very large embedding degree, without blowing
up the size of the matrix. On the other hand, a very large embedding degree
is not always necessary.
On the other hand, in elliptic curves, the order of the group is about the
same as the size of the field. For 80-bit security, we must take the field to
be around 2160, to defend against any square-root algorithms. In the case
of circulants, the order of a circulant matrix can be large. This enables us
to use smaller field for the same security. In circulants, one can use the
extended Euclid’s algorithm to compute the inverse.
So, as we said before, we are not in a position to declare a clear winner in
this case. However, if the size of the field is important in the implementa-
tion, and a moderate embedding degree suffices for security, then circulants
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are a little ahead in the game. We explain this by some examples in the
next section.
It is clear that the keysize for circulant matrices will be larger than that of
the elliptic curve cryptosystem, both satisfying the following:
1: Security of 80 bits or more from generic algorithms.
2: Security from index-calculus comparable to the field F21000 , i.e.,
index calculus security of 1000 bits.
5. AN ALGORITHM
Recall that C(d, q) is isomorphic to Fq[x]
x− 1
×
Fq[x]
Φ(x)
. We now describe an
algorithm to find a circulant matrix satisfying the above five conditions.
Algorithm 1 (Construct a circulant matrix satisfying five conditions).
Input q, d.
• construct Fq.
• τ(x)← A primitive polynomial of degree d− 1 over Fq.
• order← Order of the determinant of the companion matrix of τ(x).
• Use Chinese remainder theorem to find ψ(x) such that ψ(x) = 1
mod (x− 1) and ψ(x) = τ(x) mod Φ(x).
• ψ(x)← ψ(x) mod (xd − 1).
• A← The circulant matrix with the first row ψ(x).
• A← Aorder.
Output A.
Using Magma [1] and Algorithm 1, we were able to compute several cir-
culant matrices over many different fields of characteristic 2. We produce
part of that data in Table 1. The row with q is the size of the field exten-
sion and the row with d is the size of the circulant matrix over that field
extension.
To construct the table, we considered all possible field extensions of size
q, where q varies from 240 to 2100. For each such extension, we took all
the primes, d, from 11 to 50. We then checked and tabulated the ones for
which q is primitive modulo d. For every extension q and for all primes d,
satisfying the primitivity condition, Algorithm 1 was used and the output
matrix was checked for all the five conditions and moreover the order of the
matrix A was found to be at least qd−3. So, if q is primitive modulo d, our
algorithm produces the desired matrix A, satisfying all five conditions. The
computation was fast on a standard workstation.
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q 241 243 247 249 253 255
d 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 13, 19,
29, 37 29, 37 37 37 29, 37 29, 37
q 259 261 265 267 271 273
d 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19,
29, 37 29, 37 29, 37 29, 37 29, 37 29, 37
q 277 279 283 285 289 295
d 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 11, 13, 19, 13, 19, 29,
37 29, 37 37 29, 37 29, 37 37
TABLE 1. Fields from size 240 to 2100 and matrices from
size 11 to 50 that satisfy those five conditions.
So now it is clear, that there are a lot of choices for parameters for the
ElGamal cryptosystem over circulant matrices. We describe our findings
with some arbitrary examples. For more data see Table 2.
In the case, q = 289,d = 13, we found the largest prime factor of the
order of A to be
7993364465170792998716337691033251350895453313.
The base two logarithm of this prime is 152.5. So even if we use the Pohlig-
Hellman algorithm to reduce the discrete logarithm in A, to the discrete
logarithm problem in the prime factors of the order of A, we still have the
security very close to the 80-bit security from generic attacks. The security
against the index calculus is the same as in F21068 .
In case of q = 239,d = 29, the largest prime factor of A was
3194753987813988499397428643895659569.
The logarithm base 2 of which is about 120. So from generic attack, the
security is about 260 or sixty bit security. From index calculus the security
is the same as the security of a field of size F21092 .
In the case of q = 245,d = 29, the largest prime factor of the order of A
is 15169173997557864184867895400813639018421 with more than 60 bit
security. The security against the index calculus is equivalent to F21260 .
In the case of q = 297,d = 11, the largest prime divisor of A is
50996843392805314313033252108853668830963472293743769141−
06957559915561,
the logarithm base 2 is 231. Security from generic attacks is 115 bits and
from index calculus is equivalent to the field F2970 , i.e., 970 bits security.
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In the case of q = 243,d = 29, the largest prime factor of the order is
1597133026914484603924687622599912490649282490944114−
1855981389550399714935349,
the logarithm of that is 253. So this has about 125 bit security from the
generic attacks and 1204 bit security from index calculus attack.
In the case of q = 229,d = 37, the largest prime factor is
328017025014102923449988663752960080886511412965881,
with logarithm 167, i.e., security of more than 80 bits from generic attacks
and 1044 bits from index calculus.
Using GAP [3], we created Table 2. In this table, all extensions q, q from
245 to 290 and all primes from 10 to 20 are considered. For those extensions
and primes, it was checked if q is primitive mod d. If that was so, then
the circulant matrix A was constructed and both the generic and the index
calculus security was tabulated.
5.1. Complexity of exponentiation of a circulant matrix of size d. Let
us assume, that the circulant matrix of size d is A and we are raising it to
power m, i.e., compute Am. We are using the square and multiply algo-
rithm. We know that squaring of circulants is free, and multiplication of
two circulant matrices of size d takes about d2 field multiplications. The
number of multiplications in the exponentiation is the same as the num-
ber of ones in the binary expansion of m. It is expected that a finite random
string of zeros and ones will have about the same number of zeros and ones.
So the expected number of ones in the binary expansion of m is 1
2
log2m.
So the expected number of field multiplications required to compute Am is
d2
2
log2m.
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